Abstract
The Absolute and Relative Decline of America's Big Cities and Its Fiscal Consequences
It is not new for cities to bear economic and social burdens for the Nation. In the past, however, cities had the economic and political resources to respond dynamically to the burdens imposed on them. The situation today is different because structural problems have so weakened many cities that they are unable, and sometimes unwilling, to respond adequately to the difficulties they now face.
The old economic predominance of cities has been eroded by the decentralization of both population and jobs within metropolitan areas, a process that dates back many decades. Exhibits 1 and 2 document these changes over the past 20 years for a selected group of large metropolitan areas, their central cities, and their outlying suburban regions. Even in the high-growth Sunbelt region, the population increase and employment growth in these metropolitan areas generally have been due to growth primarily outside the central cities.
Although public policies have increased the decentralization of population within metropolitan areas beyond what would have occurred from technological change alone, the problem of cities is not one of loss of population share relative to the suburbs. Much more problematic is the sharp rise-beginning in the 1970s-in the poverty concentration Of course, public welfare, health, and hospitals are not the only programs with high costs from increased poverty. Corrections, education, housing and community development, and public safety are among the local government functions that are likely to be more expensive the greater the percentage of the population in poverty. Even excluding education, Janet Rothenberg Pack (1995) estimates that each additional percentage point of poverty is associated with another $23 per capita in these municipal expenditures in 1989-90. Even if all the intergovernmental aid not tied to public welfare, health, and hospital expenditures had been targeted to indirect poverty costs associated with corrections, housing, and public safety, it would account for only 60 percent of these higher expenditures.
In a select group of cities, the poverty problem is compounded by a recent large influx of immigrants. Immigration policy is nationally designed and provides an especially clear example of an uncompensated financial burden borne by cities. Numerous studies show that immigrants probably still provide a net benefit to the Nation because in the long run their productivity level tends to make up for the high costs they generate upon arrival. However, during the 1980s immigrants generated a serious cash flow problem for the nine metropolitan areas that are home to almost 60 percent of all immigrants entering the United States. 2 The concentration of immigrants is even greater than that of poverty. Three cities-Los Angeles, Miami, and New York-were home to 43 percent of the total inflow in the 1980s, and Los Angeles is estimated to account for nearly 25 percent of all recent immigrants. The primary reason that immigrants are at least a temporary resource drain on these cities is that most of the tax revenues generated by immigrants go to State and Federal Governments, while the bulk of the services they use-primarily education, health, and hospital related-is provided by counties and cities.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1992) has estimated that, of the revenue generated by all immigrants in Los Angeles County in 1991-92, 60 percent (or $1,130 per immigrant) went to the Federal Government, 29 percent (or $538 per immigrant) went to the State of California, with the county and other local governments receiving the remaining 11 percent (or $204 per immigrant). Immigrants account for a disproportionate 31 percent of Los Angeles County expenditures, equivalent to about $350 per immigrant. If education costs are included-they are not a county responsibility in California-the net financial cost rises to about $870 per immigrant. GAO figures show that these immigrants represent a net financial gain for the Nation and that the county and local governments could be properly compensated for their costs from the revenues generated by the immigrants themselves.
Exhibit 3
Poverty Rate for All Persons, Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1969 , 1979 , 1989 While the Nation's poverty and immigrant populations were increasingly becoming urban phenomena without commensurate real growth in intergovernmental aid to the cities with the greatest poverty and immigrant concentrations, the political strength and will to manage resources efficiently waned in many larger municipal governments. Municipal fiscal planning and management deteriorated for many reasons, including the virtual disappearance of competition among political parties in some locales. In addition, the increased empowerment of individual constituencies and neighborhoods sometimes led political leaders to maximize the welfare of their localized political bases, rather than to achieve the best possible outcome for the city as a whole.
This tendency is seen most clearly in New York City, for which net poverty expenditures (that is, after netting out intergovernmental aid) were 26.6 percent of own-source revenues in 1989-90. New York City's percentage is very high compared with the 12-to 13-percent average for all larger cities. Although redistribution should not be interpreted as evidence of general inefficiency, the outcome in New York City probably serves well key parts of the local political leadership at the expense of the long-run economic health of the city as whole. New York City has enormous location-specific rents arising from its position as the Nation's and world's financial capital, but the high taxes and borrowing this permits help finance a high level of poverty-related local spending that has made the city less attractive to a number of potential residents and businesses.
In sum, the currently precarious social and economic condition of many of the Nation's largest cities has arisen from a combination of factors:
s A long-term trend of job and population decentralization to the outlying parts of metropolitan areas.
s A recent period of two to three decades of increasing poverty concentrations in larger cities.
s A general growing resource mismatch problem caused by intergovernmental aid not being reallocated to compensate those jurisdictions bearing increasing shares of the country's poverty-related burdens.
s A resource misuse problem due to inefficient municipal management of available resources.
Does Urban Decline Warrant Government Intervention and a New Urban Strategy?
It is tempting to follow a classic economic argument that no policy response is needed because cities should compete just like firms-and thrive and die like firms. If cities are inviting places in which to live and work, they will flourish; if they are not, they will decline, and so be it. The case of Smith-Corona, the typewriter company, provides an excellent example of this line of reasoning. To the benefit of its workers and shareholders, Smith-Corona flourished for many years as a premier maker of mechanical and then electric typewriters. However, the company was not able to respond successfully to the development of the personal computer and easy-to-use word processing software. The firm declined and eventually filed for bankruptcy protection, causing shares to lose much of their value and many workers to forfeit their jobs. The mere fact of company decline and its associated costs to shareholders and employees provides no economic justification for public intervention. In fact, the efficient outcome requires that scarce human and financial resources be redeployed from Smith-Corona to more productive computer hardware and software producers.
If the issue were purely one of technological obsolescence, this line of argument would apply to the decline of cities, too. Why the analogy is not completely appropriate to the urban situation is suggested by the fact that poverty burdens of big cities have risen while real intergovernmental aid has fallen. That is, during the past two to three decades, many of the largest cities have taken on responsibilities that extend far beyond their own local markets without being properly recompensed. Thus, the markets for firms and residents in which cities operate are far from perfect, with many larger cities competing at a disadvantage because of their relatively high and underfunded poverty burdens. This leads to a distortion in the location decisions made by firms and people. At the business and household levels, both firms and families correctly perceive that the private costs of locating in a city are higher than in the suburbs. This perception helps lead them to the decision to locate in the suburbs, if moving costs are not too high. However, their purely private location decisions ignore the added costs to society that also arise from these decisions. For example, urban sprawl and congestion are made worse. As a result, trillions of dollars in investments in the public and private infrastructures of cities are being depreciated faster than optimal. 3 With respect to the poor themselves, the aggregate poverty rate is higher than it would be if everybody had to pay the full social costs associated with his or her decision to escape some of its costs by moving outside the central city. In addition, very high social costs may be associated with the increasingly dense concentrations of poverty left in the urban core of our metropolitan areas. 4 In summary, economic efficiency, not only fairness, calls for a policy response to our heightening urban problems. That strategy must deal with the underlying structural problems besetting the environment in which cities compete. When thinking about that environment and its spatial nature, it becomes clear that an effective policy requires more of a place-based component to complement the people-based aid programs that have been the centerpiece of the Nation's response to the issue of the growing concentration of the urban poor.
Thinking About Place-and People-Based Aid as Part of an Urban Strategy Current poverty policy in the United States is largely people based-that is, transfers are made directly to individuals or households. Because many larger cities have high concentrations of poor, these programs represent the bulk of urban poverty-related aid. For example, the August 1, 1996, Philadelphia Inquirer reported that nearly 228,000 Philadelphia city residents received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments in May 1996, compared with only 40,000 in the four Philadelphia suburban counties-and these Pennsylvania counties have a greater population than the central city itself.
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In terms of poverty, policymakers have concluded that aid should pass directly to poor people and that they should decide where and how to live. Substantial sums of money are transferred this way. If we consider only major means-tested cash and noncash income maintenance and housing programs, Federal spending in 1992 totalled roughly $160 billion, and State and local spending was another $82 billion, according to the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 589 .
The problem with this approach is that the work by Pack (1995) and Kermit Daniel (1994) clearly indicate that this aid has not fully recompensed cities for being home to increasing numbers of the impoverished. Cities with large poor populations are still forced to use relatively large amounts of own-source revenues to care for their poor. To reiterate, this situation requires higher local taxes paid predominantly by the resident nonpoor or lower quality public services or both, leaving the city uncompetitive from a fiscal perspective.
Admittedly, the goal of people-based transfer schemes is to help recipients, not to make cities financially competitive. The argument here is not that people-based schemes are somehow bad or inappropriate; rather, it is that such programs involving even very large dollar amounts cannot be viewed as comprising a well-rounded urban strategy. From an economic perspective, exhibit 4 illustrates how we should think about the proper distribution of people-versus place-based aid, given some fixed amount of total aid available. The vertical axes measure the marginal social benefit of an added dollar of placed-based aid and people-based aid. Both marginal benefit curves slope downward because each added dollar tends to generate less benefit than the previous dollar. 6 The optimal distribution of people-based aid versus place-based aid is where the two curves intersect, for that is where the social benefit of a dollar spent on each type of aid is equated. Where the curves cross in reality is a question in urgent need of research. However, this discussion strongly suggests that, in terms of an urban strategy, we are well to the left of point A in exhibit 4 and that we need to increase the relative amount of place-based aid.
7 Of course, the research suggests that an inefficiently small number of transfers is currently being made. If so, place-based aid should greatly complement, not substitute for, peoplebased aid.
Exhibit 4
Place-Based Aid Some insight into why direct transfers to the poor in cities are not likely to have much impact on net city revenues, and thus not likely to do much to reduce the distortion in firms' and households' location decisions, can be gained by considering the three possible impacts such spending could have on the city treasury. The first way direct transfers to the poor could affect city revenues is by income effects on the city tax base and, hence, its tax revenues. People-based transfers make the poor less impoverished, leaving them able to pay higher rents or house prices than would otherwise be the case. Thus, average property values are higher. If all else is held constant, the city realizes added revenues equal to the sum implied by equation (1) The added revenues realized from the increased property tax base mean that tax rates themselves do not have to be as high as would otherwise be the case. However, this income effect on property values is likely to be small for the simple reason that the per capita level of the transfer is small. That is, welfare-related payments do not turn the poor into middle-class households that could substantially bid up property values by demanding a much higher quality housing stock.
The second way that direct transfers could affect city finances is by influencing the cost of local service provision. City service costs are probably a decreasing function of the income of the poor, as illustrated in equation (2): 
Lower costs imply that taxes do not have to be as high, thereby improving the city's competitive position. Unfortunately, from a city treasurer's perspective, the savings to the city are probably minimal compared with the level of those costs (that is, ∂City Costs/ ∂Income of the Poor is small compared with the amount of City Costs). Just as food stamps and AFDC payments do not generate large income effects that could substantially increase the tax base, they also do not cut service costs enough to pay anywhere near the full costs of services, such as educating the children of poor households.
The third possible avenue of impact of people-based aid on the health of the city treasury is through its influence on the poor choosing to live in the city. This effect probably is small because, as one examines this problem today, most poor already reside in the central city. The spatial distribution of the poor within a metropolitan area probably has more to do with local zoning than with Federal or State poverty programs. Hence, direct people-based transfers probably have little effect on the number of poor in the city, except to the extent that the payments are housing related.
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To summarize, although direct means-tested transfers to individuals may greatly benefit their recipients, their impact on net city revenues is fairly limited-at least at current transfer levels. Hence, a purely or predominantly people-based strategy does not internalize the spatial distortion and its associated social costs as firms and people avoid highpoverty-rate jurisdictions.
The Costs to the Nation
There is relatively little empirical research into the social costs of this distortion, even though these costs are likely to be very large. They include the following:
s A small portion of the costs of urban sprawl; for example, the value of wasted time because of roadway congestion is estimated to be about $39 billion a year in the 50 largest metropolitan areas. 10 While not all, or even most, urban sprawl should be attributed to location decisions influenced by the high costs to cities of having to care for large numbers of impoverished households, attributing even a small fraction of the associated costs yields a large number.
s A large portion of the social loss associated with the high writeoff of the trillions of dollars of investments in city infrastructures. Writing off these assets faster than would be the case if nonpoor city and suburban residents truly bore the same costs for caring for the poor that are increasingly concentrated in large central cities yields a social loss that easily runs into the billions of dollars each year.
s The added social costs associated with the fact that the national poverty rate is higher than it would be in the absence of the distorted location decision. This may seem perplexing, but it follows from basic microeconomics that if the more well-off households were able to avoid some of the full costs of poverty simply by locating in a suburban jurisdiction, more poverty would result. Simply put, if many people do not have to pay the full price for something, the quantity demanded (tolerated in this case) will be higher. Social costs here probably are greatest in terms of the lost laborforce productivity associated with the greater number of poor households.
s The added social costs of destructive and dysfunctional behavior that some social scientists claim have arisen from the increased concentration of poverty in some urban areas. This research into so-called peer-group effects is controversial, but compelling evidence for it is increasing; in economic terms, the biggest part of the social loss arises from reduced productivity from people damaged by highly concentrated poverty.
Eliminating or reducing these social costs requires a place-based strategy explicitly acknowledging that impoverished households are likely to generate significant fiscal losses to cities if direct transfers to households remain near current levels. Dealing with the problem also requires taking into account the cost-benefit calculus of the nonpoor. Indeed, one possible place-based strategy would be to transfer resources directly to the nonpoor if they choose to live or invest in a high-poverty-rate city. 11 An important economic drawback of these schemes is that they typically do not target only those decisionmakers who would not locate in the city in the absence of the transfer. However, if the population elasticity of the subsidy to the nonpoor is high or the income effect on the local tax base is high or if both apply, the city's fiscal situation could markedly improve as the number of nonpoor residents or investors grows and bids up the value of the tax base.
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A closer look reveals that transfers to the nonpoor choosing to live in a high-poverty-rate city generate income effects on property values qualitatively similar to those illustrated in equation (1). A key issue for the city's treasury and its overall competitiveness is whether the effects will be quantitatively larger. Equation (3) illustrates the impact on net city revenues:
∆City Revenue = ∆#Nonpoor x Local Property Tax Rate x ∆Average Property Value of the Nonpoor.
In addition to the income effect on property values represented by the term ∆Average Property Value of the Nonpoor, we have also included a term for the changing number of nonpoor (∆#Nonpoor). This latter term represents the population elasticity and is greater than zero. Transfers to the nonpoor could also affect city service provision costs, but this effect is likely to be small on the margin (that is, ∂City Costs/∂Nonpoor Income is negative, but small).
The primary conclusion is that, if the location distortion is important, even direct transfer programs to individuals must have a place-based component. And, if the income effects and population elasticities are greater for the nonpoor, as seems likely, incorporating place-based transfers will help reduce this distortion.
An Urban Audit To Determine Place-Based Aid
Politics will rightly play a large role in determining the ultimate shape of any place-based urban aid strategy. In this section, we describe an Urban Audit that can be used to design a system involving transfers to local jurisdictions that are functions of their local poverty burden and their efficiency at delivering local public services.
13
The overarching goals of the Urban Audit are twofold:
s Measure the costs of burdens that cities are bearing for the rest of the country and efficiently allocate those costs across the entire citizenry so that individuals bear their share of the overall burden, no matter where they live or work. As discussed above, the present system simply allows too many Americans to act as if the true costs of high levels of poverty and immigration in central cities are relatively small.
s Provide an incentive structure for municipal governments to use the resources that are available to them more efficiently. In addition, cities whose managements are focused on delivery of key services should also receive more than those that expend scarce resources on local redistributional programs that properly are the functions of State and Federal governments. Local governments typically are so severely constrained by their boundaries that their efforts to redistribute tend to be counterproductive and excessively costly.
Political realities also appear to require that any restructuring of resources for urban areas be expenditure neutral in the aggregate. Beyond that, expenditure neutrality enforces the necessary tradeoffs between more and less efficient spending. A meaningful, expenditure-neutral lifeline can be implemented if the new aid allocation criteria are applied to the full complement of intergovernmental revenues that flow to local jurisdictions (for example, infrastructure development funds for roads and sewerage), not just to the portion traditionally thought of as urban aid (for example, Community Development Block Grants).
14 Implementing an Urban Audit would be difficult because the data requirements for its proper functioning are rigorous. Building a capacity that includes the collection and maintenance of a large database of comparable local variables across jurisdictions is critical. While such data presently are not readily available, we can create a stylized, but still informative, illustration of how transfer levels and efficiency ratings could be estimated. This is done for the single local public function, police services, using a limited number of variables for a cross section of central cities.
A Stylized Example of Estimating Costs
The first step is to estimate how much more costly a small increase in the city's household poverty rate (POV j ) is in terms of expenditures per capita on police services (POL j ), holding constant other factors that also influence service delivery costs. For the purposes of illustration only, assume that those other factors are the city's population density (Popden j ), crime rate (Crime j ), and cost of living (COL j ). This leads to the following specification of city j's police expenditures per capita:
where ∈ j is the standard error term and βs are coefficients.
An immediate econometric problem arises from the possibility that police spending could also influence the level of each of the right-side variables in equation (4). This suggests that they are simultaneously determined. The possibility that police spending influences the crime rate rather than the amount of crime driving police spending probably is the most obvious problem. That is, one reason crime rates might be high is that not enough is spent on police services. This means that our coefficients potentially suffer from simultaneity bias.
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While this problem can be dealt with via more complex econometric techniques, which require better data, the simple single equation (4) suits our needs because it outlines the basic strategy underlying the implementation of the first stage of the Urban Audit without getting bogged down in econometric details. In addition, amid all the potential biases arising from a single-equation estimation, the results of equation (4) reported below most probably represent a lower bound on the true impact of the effects of poverty on police spending. The two dominant biases have to do with selectivity issues. First, the sample used contains no suburbs. Including safe suburbs-with virtually no impoverished households and very low expenditures on public safety-would certainly steepen the regression line for the relation between local poverty rates and police spending. Second, city-level data do not permit the equation to capture the effect that would result if well-off city residents experienced the same amount of crime that exists in poor areas of the city. That is, the estimated relation between poverty and police spending is probably less strong the greater the degree of residential segregation by income.
One serious counter to the argument that β 1 is biased downward involves not controlling for taxes. If higher spending is associated with higher taxes and higher taxes lead to increased outmigration of the well-off, the coefficient on poverty may be picking up this omitted variable effect. Future research certainly should build larger and more representative samples, so that structural equations of all relevant variables can be specified and a system of equations estimated.
The underlying data for each city are reported in exhibit 5, with the results of estimating equation (4) presented in exhibit 6. More than one-half of the variance in police spending per capita across our sample of cities is explained by the four variables. This discussion focuses on the coefficient for the local poverty rate, because of its implications for the level of transfers needed to equalize burdens for higher poverty jurisdictions. Its estimated value of about 222 implies that a city with a poverty rate 1 percentage point greater than the sample mean spends an extra $2.22 per capita on police services, all else held constant. Stated differently, this is the per person fiscal cost to the city of added poverty for police services, holding constant the crime rate, the cost of living, and population density.
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If we apply this regression result and use a more nationally representative 14-percent poverty rate as the base for determining transfers, the estimated transfer to the city of Philadelphia-with a 20.3-percent poverty rate-will be approximately $22 million dollars. 17 This is the annual transfer needed so that residents of Philadelphia do not have to spend more per capita than would be the case if the city had only the 14-percent poverty rate. This figure is obtained by first determining the extra per capita spending by the city due to poverty, with all else held constant. This per capita spending is 6.3 (Philadelphia's 20.3-percent poverty rate, less the presumed 14-percent national average rate) times the $2.22 per capita estimated poverty effect, or 6.3 x 2.22 = 13.99. This translates into $22.182 million for the 1.586 million residents of Philadelphia in 1990 (that is, 13.99 x 1,586,000). The third column of exhibit 7 reports the results of analogous calculations for each city in our sample. Positive values represent net inflows needed to ensure that a city's residents would not have to pay more per capita than would be the case if their city had the presumed 14-percent average poverty rate. Negative values represent outflows (that is, payments to high-poverty-rate cities) that would bring the low-poverty-rate cities' costs up to those of the hypothetical city with the presumed 14-percent national-average poverty rate.
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The $22 million figure for Philadelphia amounts to only about 1 percent of the city's annual budget of more than $2 billion. This figure is relatively small probably because of the nature of police spending. Many police resources are spent securing relatively safe areas. This is partly due to the political clout of the well-off, for they demand and receive good police services in all cities, regardless of the overall poverty rate. As the regression results imply, a bit more is spent in higher poverty cities. Although it cannot be determined from a regression with city-level data, most of the estimated effect may be due to increased expenditures to secure the relatively well-off who chose to remain in the city. Estimated Transfer = 2.22 x (City Poverty Rate -14-percent National Average) x City Population
The results probably would be quite different if corrections or criminal justice spending were analyzed, because spending on those functions probably is much more strongly related to local poverty conditions. Consequently, equalizing the poverty burden might require funding most of the local spending for criminal justice through transfers from low-poverty jurisdictions.
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Adjusting the Estimate
The second part of the Urban Audit adjusts the first-stage estimate on the basis of the relative efficiency of a city's expenditures on police services. A rough estimate of whether a city is spending too much on police services can be gleaned by comparing actual police expenditures per capita with those estimated from equation (4). These figures are reported in exhibit 8, along with the difference between the two values, which by definition equals the residual (∈) from equation (4). Note that Philadelphia's per capita spending level of $205 is $4 more than its estimated $201 level. If one assumes that poverty, crime, population density, and the cost-of-living variables largely determine police spending, expenditures in excess of the level estimated by these factors will not be warranted by objective conditions in the city. 20 The simplest adjustment to the transfer amount would be made by interpreting the $4 per capita residual as pure waste that should not be recompensed by transfers from residents of lower than average poverty cities. For example, Philadelphia would be due only a $9.99 per capita transfer ($13.99 -$4.00), or $15.8 million in aggregate.
For a city such as Detroit, its huge positive residual of $82 exceeds its implied transfer of $40.85 per capita. 21 For other cities, even one with a very high poverty rate, it is possible that gross inefficiency in service delivery is largely driving its spending behavior. However, cases such as this raise the distinct possibility that interpreting the entire residual as solely representing waste or inefficiency is in error. No regression can control for all relevant factors determining local spending-and that certainly is the case in our stylized example. Even in a well-specified model estimated on better data, at least some of a city's positive (or negative) residual will be due to uncontrolled-for factors not associated with things such as wasteful overstaffing or unjustified wage premiums. Consequently, some effort should be made to correlate the residuals with measures of staffing and wages before they are used to adjust estimated transfer payments.
Exhibit 9 presents police personnel-staffing and wage data for a subset of cities from exhibit 5. Exhibit 10 reports selected results from the regression of residuals from equation (4) on various combinations of these variables. 22 In general, the results show that differences in staffing account for little of the variance in police-spending residuals across cities. However, differences in wages per city resident are able to explain more than 15 percent of the variance in the city's spending residuals. When both staffing and wages are included as regressors, the results suggest that virtually all explanatory power is due to the wage variable.
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Exhibit 9
City Government Finances, Police Department Data Given that overall cost-of-living differences across cities are already controlled for in the regression generating the spending residuals, the findings in exhibit 10 suggest that wage premiums beyond those warranted by the local cost of living can account for just under one-fifth of the variance in city spending residuals. This result leaves most of the residual variance unexplained, but it does suggest that some downward adjustment of transfers to relatively high-poverty-rate cities is warranted if those cities are found to have relatively high public wages.
Given the imprecision of the statistical analysis underlying the second part of the Urban Audit, it probably is best to apply simple rules of thumb-for example, those with positive residuals above the 75th fractal of the distribution would lose 20 percent of their transfer implied by equation (4); those with residuals between the 50th and 75th fractiles of the distribution would lose only 10 percent of their implied transfer, and so forth.
Where fine distinctions are not really possible, the goal should be to reward municipal performance that clearly is exemplary with additional resources and to withhold at least some resources from cities that clearly are inefficient. Econometrics can and should be used to help identify those cities, but common sense rules should then come into play.
Conclusions
This article has outlined an urban strategy that calls for a new examination of the need for place-based aid to complement the people-based aid programs currently in existence. Cities with relatively high poverty rates remain high-cost places in which to live and work, even with hundreds of billions of dollars of means-tested monetary and in-kind transfers annually flowing to their poorer residents. Therefore, place-based aid to jurisdictions is needed to eliminate the spatial cost differential that firms and middle-class households perceive. An Urban Audit is needed to provide estimates of how much aid is needed to equalize poverty-related costs of various public services across jurisdictions and to give localities incentives to employ the funds efficiently. 2. The figures cited relating to immigration are from Daniel (1994) .
3. Haughwout and Inman (1996) conservatively estimate the value of city-owned land, structures, and equipment to exceed $1 billion even in the smallest of America's big cities. The value of private investments in cities is, of course, much larger. Gyourko and Summers (1995) estimate that the sum of the aggregate taxable and exempt property values for the nine largest cities in the United States is nearly $1.6 trillion. The annual social loss from writing down these investments too quickly will easily run into the tens of billions of dollars.
4. In addition, pure externalities may be related to concentrated poverty in cities that warrant corrective action. Crime is perhaps the best example. Recent research suggests that outmigration rates of middle-class households from perceived and actual increases in crime are quite high (Cullen and Levitt, 1996) . To the extent the added crime that leads to the mobility is due to increased poverty, which itself is due to public policy, a classic laissez-faire prescription is not warranted, for the city population is inefficiently low in this case.
5.
Figures from the 1990 census show that slightly more than 1.58 million people resided in the city of Philadelphia. The four suburban Pennsylvania counties (Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery) had 2.1 million residents.
6. Establishing the sign of the slopes is somewhat problematic. For example, strict Libertarians may argue that both schedules are positively sloped, believing that the marginal transfer harms social welfare. However, for those households near the median income level, the negative slope is more likely.
7. It is possible that society cares so much about reducing the Gini coefficient that great social utility is reaped from the direct transfers. If so, it could be that the marginal social benefit curve for people-based transfers starts out well above that for placebased transfers. This influence could lead the slope of the schedule to be relatively flat. Both features would lead to a crossing of curves at a point indicating that the vast majority of transfers be people based. However, a more likely reason so few place-based transfers are implemented is that there is little recognition of their social value in terms of internalizing the spatial distortion associated with firm and household location decisions within the metropolitan area.
8. There could also be some spillover onto nonpoor values because the negative externality of the poor is not as large with the people-based transfers, leading to a lower level of impoverishment.
9. This last point is relevant because almost all public housing is located in central cities, and suburbs are adept at zoning out low-cost, high-density housing. In some large cities, the public housing stock provides a large fraction of the housing service flow consumed by poor households. Hence, the decisions of where to locate public housing may have had a material impact on the location of the poor over time.
10. See Hanks and Lomax (1991) . Also see Downs (1992) for a broader analysis of the congestion-related costs associated with sprawl.
11. District of Columbia Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton's recent proposal for a flat income tax on Washington, D.C., residents and a reduced capital gains tax rate on investments in Washington, D.C., is an example of such a scheme.
12. That is, these schemes could be relatively cost effective in reducing the location decision distortion, even though not targeted toward marginal decisionmakers. The alternative people-based aid clearly does little to reduce the location-decision distortion.
13. Of course, one can envision other types of place-based systems. The simplest conceptually would be to redistribute the poor spatially-that is, to the suburbs-so that each jurisdiction had an equal share of the poverty burden. The same effect could be achieved by changing the service cost level to the city. For example, higher levels of government could take over financial responsibility for expensive local services, such as primary and secondary education, that are heavily used by the poor. In theory, some form of local regional burden sharing among communities within given metropolitan areas also could be designed to achieve the same end.
14. That is, expenditure neutrality applies only to the system at large. Applying the first part of the Urban Audit to general infrastructure aid programs certainly would result in net transfers from newer suburban areas (and ultimately from their developers or residents or both) to higher poverty-rate cities. In this case, place-based aid would complement, not substitute for, existing people-based aid, and the total amount of transfers to the high-poverty jurisdictions would increase. However, net transfers within the Federal system would not increase, so there would be no increase in the overall budget deficit.
15. Simultaneity problems are likely to exist for the estimation of most other local public function spending.
16. This assumes that all such spending is from own-source revenues. To the extent that this is not true, the estimated transfer amounts reported below would be reduced accordingly.
17. Of course, the estimate is for marginal changes about the sample mean. Again, the estimation and computation are for illustrative purposes only.
18. The transfers do not sum to zero in this case because our base for calculation is 14 percent rather than the 17.7-percent sample mean. The sample mean is higher because it contains no suburbs.
19. Education-related costs of poverty will probably be largest. Summers and Ritter (1996) estimate that a city with 20 percent of its children living in poverty spends, from its own tax dollars, about $400 more per pupil than a city with only 10 percent of its children living in poverty.
20. Obviously, the four regressors do not capture all systematic patterns in spending, as indicated by the R 2 of 0.58.
21. This is computed as its $41,991,774 transfer divided by its 1,028,000 people in 1990.
22. These results are based on a subset of 50 cities for which we have police-staffing and wage information as well as data on all variables needed to estimate equation (4).
23. We also experimented with specifications that included benefit measures, but they yielded no significant results. The sample sizes were small, which certainly could have been a contributing factor. Reestimating the specifications reported in exhibit 10 for subsamples of high-and low-poverty cities also did not yield findings much different from those reported here. Again, working with larger and more diverse samples of cities in the future may lead to somewhat different estimates.
